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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4726 
 ___________ 
 
 KAMORUDEEN SOWEMIMO, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A075-821-925) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew Arthur 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 5, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Kamorudeen Sowemimo petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) 
order denying Sowemimo’s application for relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”) and directing his removal to Nigeria.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
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dismiss the petition for review. 
I 
 Sowemimo, a citizen of Nigeria, entered the United States without inspection in 
1993.  However, he obtained conditional permanent resident status in 1998 and, in March 
2001, became a lawful permanent resident.  In September 2001, Sowemimo was 
convicted in federal court of participating in a conspiracy to distribute heroin, and he was 
sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment. 
 In 2009, Sowemimo was served with a notice to appear, which charged him as 
removable for, among other things, having committed an aggravated felony.  Sowemimo 
appeared before the IJ and conceded all of the charges against him, but sought relief 
under the CAT.  Sowemimo explained that, in 2003, a fellow inmate attempted to 
sexually assault him.  Although Sowemimo was initially overpowered, he was able to 
fend off his attacker with other inmates’ help.  Sowemimo was then transferred to a 
different facility and given counseling.  Sowemimo argued that homosexual contact is 
illegal in Nigeria and, because his attack had become public knowledge in Nigeria after 
he told his relatives, he would be subject to torture.  Sowemimo was particularly 
concerned that authorities would torture him to coerce a false confession that he willingly 
engaged in homosexual contact, such a confession being necessary for a conviction under 
Nigerian law, and that he would be imprisoned or executed. 
 In support of his CAT application, Sowemimo submitted notes from his 
psychologist indicating that he fears returning to Nigeria because he would be perceived 
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as homosexual, as well as news articles and country reports indicating that Nigeria 
generally treats homosexuals poorly and criminalizes homosexual relationships.  The IJ 
denied relief, reasoning that Sowemimo failed to demonstrate a likelihood that he would 
be tortured by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public 
official.  In the IJ’s view, Sowemimo did not present sufficient evidence that Nigeria 
punishes individuals for engaging in homosexual relationships abroad or for being the 
victim of a sexual assault perpetrated by a person of the same sex. 
 On appeal, the BIA conducted de novo review and, agreeing with the IJ’s 
determination, dismissed Sowemimo’s appeal.  Sowemimo filed a petition for review, but 
we granted the Government’s unopposed motion to remand in light of this Court’s 
decision in Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010).  See C.A. No. 10-1565 
(order entered August 10, 2010).  On remand, the BIA applied the Kaplun framework for 
reviewing the IJ’s decision and reached the same conclusion, i.e., that the IJ’s decision 
was correct.  Sowemimo then filed this petition for review. 
II 
 As the Government argues in its brief, we generally lack jurisdiction to review a 
final order of removal against a criminal alien, like Sowemimo, who is removable for 
having committed an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  Even when this 
jurisdiction-stripping provision applies, we may review “constitutional claims or 
questions of law” raised in a petition for review.  See § 1252(a)(2)(D).  However, “[o]ur 
jurisdiction in that respect is ‘narrowly circumscribed’ in that it is limited to ‘colorable 
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claims or questions of law.’”  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted in original).  A claim is not colorable if “it is immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and 
frivolous.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  We must therefore 
determine at the outset whether Sowemimo’s petition raises a colorable legal or 
constitutional question, as distinguished from factual questions over which we lack 
jurisdiction.  See Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 102 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 As we explained in Kaplun, an IJ’s evaluation of a CAT claim includes two 
distinct questions:  “(1) what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed; and (2) does 
what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture?”1
 Construing Sowemimo’s pro se petition liberally, we discern only two possible 
legal arguments over which we might have jurisdiction.  First, Sowemimo characterizes 
the sexual assault he endured as torture and suggests that the attack therefore qualifies 
  602 F.3d at 271.  The 
first of these two questions is a factual matter.  See id.  Sowemimo’s primary argument 
on appeal is that the IJ and BIA erred in concluding that he did not show a likelihood that 
he will be harmed if he returns to Nigeria.  This plainly amounts to an attack on the 
Agency’s factual determination, and we lack jurisdiction to entertain Sowemimo’s 
argument. 
                                                 
1  To prevail on a claim for relief under the CAT, an applicant “bears the burden of 
establishing ‘that it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to 
the proposed country of removal.’”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). 
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him for CAT relief.  Although we express our agreement with the IJ that Sowemimo was 
the victim of an unconscionable sexual attack, the violence he suffered while incarcerated 
in the United States does not, under the governing law, provide a basis for deferring his 
removal to Nigeria.2
 Next, Sowemimo argues that the BIA impermissibly ignored evidence.  Although 
Sowemimo correctly notes that the BIA must consider evidence that is favorable to him, 
see Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2010), the BIA’s review is 
limited to the record before the IJ.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (“the Board will not 
engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals”).  The evidence Sowemimo 
claims the BIA should have examined consists almost entirely of articles and reports 
presented for the first time in his petition for review.  Neither the BIA nor this Court 
could review these new documents, see Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 329-30 (3d 
Cir. 2004), and the BIA’s opinion reflects that it considered the record before it, which is 
all the law requires.  See Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (the BIA 
need not “‘expressly parse . . . each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by 
the petitioner . . .’”  (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2006))).  In sum, 
Sowemimo has not raised a colorable legal or constitutional claim in his petition for 
review. 
  See generally 8 C.F.R § 1208.16(c)(3). 
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review.
                                                 
2  In any event, it does not appear that Sowemimo presented this argument to both the 
IJ and BIA.  Thus, his argument is unexhausted, and we lack jurisdiction to review it.  
See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
